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Exploration of the frontiers of biomedical research requires the willing 
participation of millions of human subjects.  This participation primarily 
facilitates breakthroughs in generalized knowledge, but it also reveals personal 
information about the human subjects, some of which is potentially significant.  
Researchers who possess such personal information about the subjects of their 
studies arguably have – or should have – a legal duty to inform the subjects, at 
least when the information is medically significant.  While there is no such 
explicit duty in positive law and none has been previously announced by a 
common law court, some courts have softened the requirements for finding that a 
physicians and life insurers have such a duty in analogous situations.  The law has 
thus developed such that a finding that researchers have a similar duty would 
appear to be a logical next step.  In fact, the argument for a duty to disclose for 
researchers is arguably even stronger.  Courts faced with litigation alleging a 
researcher duty to disclose should not, however, merely import the reasoning 
from the analogous cases because doing so would further cloud the already fuzzy 
state of the interaction between researchers and subjects.  And a federal regulatory 





Research with human subjects in all its varied forms is a large and growing 
enterprise.  Tens of millions of individuals have already participated as subjects in one or 
more research protocols, and millions more participate each year.
1  Government and 
industry combined spend billions annually to support as many as twenty thousand 
research studies,
2 many of which are individually large and complex enterprises in their 
own right.
3  And these numbers are, if anything, likely to increase even further.
4  Besides 
the growth in research, two other trends related to research are apparent.  First, research-
related litigation is on the rise and appears likely to become even more widespread.
5 
Sparked at least in part by recent widely publicized instances of harm befalling research 
subjects,
6 plaintiffs’ attorneys are suing both more often and more creatively.  Related to 
this is the second trend: public trust in research is declining and, as a result, at least some 
types of research are struggling to find adequate numbers of human subjects.
7  As a result 
of these trends, exposure to potential liability and public perception are both increasingly 
important.   
                                                 
1 See Richard S. Saver, Medical Research and Intangible Harm, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 941, 944 (2006).   
2 Id. 
3 To take just one recent example, researchers recently announced that three genetic studies that collectively 
involved approximately 28,000 subjects culminated in the identification of a gene linked to lung cancer.  
See Steven Reinberg, Gene Variants Linked to Lung Cancer Identified, Washington Post, April 2, 2008. 
4 Consider, for example, that the recent passage of a Congressional bill that will prevent discrimination 
based on genetic information should further increase the numbers of people willing to serve as subjects for 
genetic research.  See Amy Harmon, Congress Passes Bill to Bar Bias Based on Genes, NY Times, May 2, 
2008 (suggesting that the new law will spur increased participation in genetic research studies). 
5 Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert, & Troyen A. Brennan, The Rise of Litigation in Human Subjects 
Research, 139 Annals of Internal Medicine 40 (2003). 
6 The most notorious example of harm befalling a research subject is likely the sad case of Jessie Gelsinger, 
a young man whose participation in a clinical trial to test an innovative gene therapy in 1999 caused his 
death.  For an example of one of the many media reports of the tragedy, see Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The 
Biotech Death of Jesse Gelsinger, N.Y. Times Mag., Nov. 28, 1999, at 136. 
7 Emily Anthes & Scott Allen, US Cancer Researchers go Abroad for Trials, Boston Globe, December 29, 
2007, at A1. 3 
 
Concomitant with all of this research is the discovery and generation of 
tremendous quantities of data specific to individual subjects, including – but not limited 
to – genetic information.  Much of this data is irrelevant to subjects’ interests because it 
lacks predictive value, has very uncertain meaning, or is otherwise uninformative.  Some, 
however, is different – some of the personal data learned during the course of research 
with human subjects bears directly on individuals’ health.  Despite the fact that much 
individual data has already been generated and that both the quantity and the quality of 
data generated seem likely to increase, there is a lack of clear guidance for researchers 
regarding whether and when such information should be divulged to the subjects on 
whom it bears.   
In this environment, the potential exists for litigation alleging that a researcher 
was negligent for failure to disclose to a subject an individual research finding of medical 
significance.  Such litigation would, in all likelihood, be a case of first impression for a 
court and would raise a heretofore unanswered question: should a researcher have a legal 
duty to disclose medically significant individual research findings to a subject?  A court 
faced with this question would appear to have precious little legal authority to which to 
turn for guidance.  And although it may seem a reach to suggest that a court would find 
that researchers have such a duty, the primary argument against a duty – that researchers 
are not acting for the benefit of their subjects – has been weakened in other contexts.  
Therefore, given the right set of facts, a court may be actually be rather amenable to 
extending the duty to disclose to researchers.  It would be a mistake, however, to import 
wholesale the reasoning from analogous cases, because doing would demonstrate a lack 4 
 
of sensitivity to context and would threaten to further blur subjects’ already fuzzy 
understanding of clinical research.  
My first argument is a descriptive one: courts in several states have, by rejecting 
the traditional rule of no duty in the context of third-party physical examinations, opened 
the door to finding a similar duty for researchers and, in fact, the argument for such duty 
in the context of research is even stronger than in the context of third-party examinations.  
Second, while not necessarily disagreeing with the outcome of these cases, I argue that 
the specific analysis employed by many of these courts makes little sense and should not 
be lifted wholesale into the research context.  Finally, I examine the implications for 
research should a legal duty to disclose be found and provide a suggestion as to how best 
to proceed.  Although I agree with the bulk of the literature that asserts that researchers 
have a moral duty to disclose medically useful results, I remain agnostic on the question 
of whether there ought to be a corresponding legal duty – the point here is that the 
primary arguments against a legal duty have been weakened considerably in other 
contexts and that, given the state of the common law, imposing a duty on researchers to 
disclose medically significant individual research findings is a logical next step. 
The focus here is primarily on only one element of tort liability – duty. Of course, 
duty alone is insufficient to establish liability for negligence.  The other three elements of 
negligence – breach, causation, and harm – must also be present.  And it is far from 
certain that these other elements would be present in a researcher disclosure case.  
Accordingly, the remaining elements of negligence liability are also discussed briefly.
 8   
                                                 
8 Two points need to be made at the outset.  First, the vast majority of information learned about individual 
subjects during the course of research is probably unlikely to have present medical value to the subject and, 
accordingly, even if a duty to disclose did exist, most individual research findings would not trigger that 
duty.  Ultimately, this is a question of the scope of the duty, not whether a duty exists at all, and it is 5 
 
Part I of this Paper introduces the field of research with human subjects and 
briefly examines some of the potentially salient differences among types of research.  
Part II surveys the existing legal constraints on such research and explores other sources 
of guidance.  In Part III, I argue that court decisions in the context of employment-related 
and life insurance physical examinations have opened the door to a researcher duty to 
disclose individual research findings, and I consider how such decisions might apply to 
researcher-subject relationships.  Part IV discusses other elements of negligence liability 
in the research context.  Part V explores some of the implications of a researcher duty to 
disclose, and the Paper concludes in Part VI. 
 
I.   Human Subjects Research 
“Research with human subjects” is a broad term that encompasses a wide variety 
of research.  It can be conceptualized in two broad categories: therapeutic research, which 
includes most clinical trials, can be distinguished from so-called “nontherapeutic” 
research in that the former has a possibility of immediate benefit to the subjects, whereas 
the latter has no such potential.
9  Within each category, the level of intervention, contact, 
                                                                                                                                                
discussed infra in Part IV.A.  Second, I do not doubt that researchers will generally report medically 
significant information to their subjects.  To the extent that this paper advances the arguments for a duty to 
disclose, it is not motivated by a distrust of researchers, and the intention here is not to suggest that they 
would intentionally seek to withhold from their subjects information that might be valuable to the latter. 
9 “Nontherapeutic” is but one possible term to describe research that does not offer the potential of 
immediate clinical benefit to subjects, but since this term has been used by courts, see Grimes v. Kennedy 
Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 837-38 (Md.  2001), I will use it here.  The key distinction is that subjects who 
enroll in such research do not stand to benefit directly by their participation; thus, the obligations to such 
subjects arguably ought to be analyzed differently, as the Grimes court suggested.  Id.  To say that the 
analysis ought to be different is not to suggest that obligations to subjects in nontherapeutic research ought 
to be categorically more or less extensive.  Clinical research often involves significantly more time and 
sacrifice on the part of the subjects, but subjects also sometimes receive potentially life-saving therapies as 
a result of their involvement.  In short, the variety of research protocols in both the therapeutic and 
nontherapeutic settings prevents wholesale generalizations about differential obligations to subjects based 
on the type of research in which they are participating.   6 
 
and time investment on the part of the subjects
10 varies considerably.   At one end of this 
continuum are research projects such as population-based genetic epidemiology studies 
wherein subjects merely submit a tissue sample for analysis – blood or saliva, for 
example – and have minimal contact with researchers.  At the other end are studies that 
are much more intrusive and time-consuming and in which subjects have much more 
contact with the researchers, who are themselves often physicians and, not uncommonly, 
are also the subjects’ treating physicians (i.e. they have a preexisting physician-patient 
relationship with subjects).  Many clinical trials fall into this latter category.  Thus, the 
relationship between a subject and a researcher can be quite different depending on the 
particular protocol, and this difference in relationships is relevant to the duties that the 
researcher owes – or should owe – his subjects.    
 
A.   Individual Research Findings 
Results obtained from research can come in a variety of forms, but “individual 
research findings” is herein taken to mean data specific to an individual that is learned as 
a result of that individual’s participation in a research study, together with any 
information signifying the importance of that particular data, such as information that the 
data indicates the presence of a particular disease or condition or that it confers a 
susceptibility to a certain disease or chemical or to an adverse reaction to a certain 
medication.  Such data might be generated during the course of clinical trials of a new 
drug conducted to gather data on safety and efficacy in hopes of garnering approval from 
                                                 
10 Commentators debate over the best term to use in describing people who participate in research – 
“subjects” or “participants.”  I use “subjects” in this paper only because it is more common in the literature, 
but my usage of that term is not an endorsement of that term nor an indication that I find it preferable to 
“participant.” 7 
 
the Food and Drug Administration to market the drug,
11 or it could result from pre-
clinical research.   
An individual research finding, as conceived here, includes both data that are the 
intended goal of the research and data that are purely incidental findings.  Data that are 
the goal of the research could include, for example, a genetic epidemiology study that 
finds that individuals with a certain allele of a given gene are at higher risk for 
contracting a given disease or diseases either by virtue of the genetic variation alone or in 
combination with certain environmental exposures (e.g. cigarette smoke).  Or 
pharmacogenetic investigators may learn that those with a certain genotype are more 
likely to suffer adverse medical events when using a given medication.  But although the 
data might be the goal of the research, it might be also be wholly incidental.  A researcher 
might discover, for example, that a blood sample submitted for an unrelated study is 
HIV-positive.  Or a brain imaging study might reveal the presence of an abnormal mass 
in the cerebrum.  For the purposes of this discussion, however, whether a finding was 
intended or merely incidental to the research is unimportant.  What matters for the 
present purposes is simply whether a researcher makes an individual research finding. 
Like research, “individual research findings” is also a broad category, and it 
includes within it data that vary widely in their potential value to a particular subject.  
Data will vary regarding their predictive value, with a range from highly predictive of 
health outcomes to negligibly so.  Similarly, data will also vary in their usefulness to a 
subject, and although usefulness is related to predictive value, it is not coextensive, 
because the extent to which there is a treatment or preventive action available for the 
                                                 
11 For an overview of the new drug approval process, see Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Drug 
Approval Application Process, available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applications/default.htm 
(last accessed May 15, 2008). 8 
 
condition or disease is an independent variable.  Thus, results might be both highly 
predictive and have relatively little usefulness if, for example, they indicate a 
significantly higher risk for a disease for which there is no prevention or cure.
12  The 
specific focus here is primarily on individual findings that are medically useful in the 
sense that there is some action that can be taken to prevent or ameliorate the condition 
indicated by the finding.  Such results are said to have ‘clinical utility’: they have actual 
medical benefit for the subject.
13 Results with clinical utility are the focus of this analysis 
because a failure to disclose such results has the potential to cause harm to a subject by 
precluding his opportunity to take action to prevent or ameliorate a condition.  On the 
other hand, a result with no clinical utility is seen as lacking in tangible benefit to the 
subject, so a failure to disclose such a result would seem highly unlikely to lead to a 
tangible harm.  In other words, a duty to disclose might exist, and yet many research 
findings would fall outside the scope of that duty, so a failure to disclose such findings 
would not constitute a breach of the duty.
14 
There is a plausible argument, however, that the concept of clinical utility is too 
narrow a metric to accurately capture the full potential value of a research finding.  For 
example, persons might find value in learning that they have a gene that puts them at 
increased risk for contracting a disease even when such disease is not preventable.  This 
might be so because a person so informed could use the information to inform her future 
planning, both generally and for reproductive decision-making.  She might also seek out 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Melissa Austin, Ethical Issues in Human Genome Epidemiology: A Case Study Based on the 
Japanese American Family Study in Seattle, Washington, 155 Am. J. Epidemiology 585 (2002) (explaining 
the study team’s decision not to notify subjects who had an allele that was discovered to predispose for 
Alzheimer’s disease on the basis that, because Alzheimer’s disease is not preventable, the information 
would be of little value to the affected subjects). 
13 See Wylie Burke & Ron Zimmerman, Ensuring the Appropriate Use of Genetic Tests, 5 Nature Reviews 
Genetics 955 (2004) (defining “clinical utility”). 
14 This point is elaborated further infra in Part IV. 9 
 
others so afflicted for support.  And she would plausibly be more motivated to actively 
seek out or monitor information related to the disease such that, should future research 
determine that certain behaviors or medications reduce the risk of contracting the disease, 
she will be better positioned to take advantage of the new information.  For these reasons 
and others, the notion that clinical utility should define a threshold for reporting 
individual research findings has been increasingly criticized of late.
15  While important, 
this issue is ultimately a question of the scope of any duty to disclose rather than whether 
a duty should exist in the first place.  Accordingly, a fuller discussion is presented below 
in Part IV, following the analysis of the duty. 
The present focus on results with clinically utility is not an endorsement of that as 
the normatively desirable threshold.  Rather, it is a pragmatic choice reflecting the nature 
of the legal inquiry.  Although the question of whether any particular result should be 
disclosed (where ‘should’ has a legal rather than moral connotation) is ultimately a 
question of the scope of the duty, rather than whether a duty exists in the first place, a 
research finding lacking in clinical utility would present a weak factual case for a court to 
find a researcher duty.
16  Thus, for simplicity and clarity, this discussion assumes an 
individual research finding with significant clinical utility – i.e. information that would, if 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Vardit Ravitsky & Benjamin S. Woolford, Disclosing Individual Genetic Results to Research 
Participants, 6 Am. J. Bioethics 8 (2006). 
16 Consider that in the cases discussed below in which courts held, for the first time, a duty to disclose in 
the context of third-party physical examinations, the information discovered by the examining party was 
typically very high in clinical utility – the presence of the HIV virus in the blood or an abnormality in the 
chest indicating the presence of lung cancer.  In each case, the disease at issue was one that, with timely 
detection, could be treated, or whose progression could at least be slowed.  Therefore, the failure to disclose 
the information to the examinee deprived him of a meaningful chance to prevent serious clinical harm or 
death.  See cases discussed infra in Part III.  Of course, a court does not actually need such a factual 
scenario to find a duty – it might find a duty, generally, but decline to find that the duty attached in the 
particular case at hand – i.e. that on the present facts, the failure to disclose was not a breach of the duty, 
perhaps because the information had no or little clinical utility.  The point is that, although the degree of 
clinical utility is technically only at issue in determining the scope of the duty, it simplifies and clarifies the 
issue to assume a clinically useful result in this discussion.  This should not, however, be taken as an 
argument that any duty to disclose should always be limited to clinically useful findings. 10 
 
known to the subject, empower her with knowledge that she could act on to prevent 
serious injury or death, or at least to substantially increase her odds of doing so. 
 
B. Genetic Data 
Much of the literature regarding the disclosure of individual research findings 
focuses on genetic research because the distinctive properties of genetic information 
present the potential for unique benefits and risks to those with whom it is shared and 
thus present particular challenges germane to the decision whether to disclose.
17   
Genetic information is at once both highly personal and shared with family 
members; this familial nature of genetic information means that it can be valuable to 
people beyond merely the research subject, and the predictive nature of the information 
gives it potential usefulness for future planning and reproductive decision-making.
18  But 
those same properties also give rise to concerns about psychosocial harms, such as 
familial strife and increased anxiety about the individual’s own future or possible effects 
on children.
19  There are also concerns that information about genetic susceptibilities 
could lead to stigmatization and discrimination in obtaining insurance or employment if 
such information is shared or becomes part of an individual’s medical records.
20 Any 
determination whether to disclose genetic information should therefore consider these 
potential harms and attempt to balance them with any anticipated benefits that may 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Research Involving Human Biological Materials: 
Ethical Issues and Policy Guidance, at 71 (1999), available at  
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/hbm.pdf (last accessed May 15, 2008) (hereinafter “NBAC”).  
18 United States Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Protection from Research Risks, 
Protecting Human Research Subjects: Institutional Review Board Guidebook, at Chapter V, Section H 
(1993), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/irb/irb_chapter5ii.htm#h12 (hereinafter “IRB Guidebook”). 
19 Id. 
20 Id.  11 
 
accrue to the subject from learning genetic information.
21  This is made more difficult by 
the somewhat speculative nature of both the benefits and psychosocial harms, and since 
much genetic data learned during the course of research is preliminary in nature, the 
additional possibility of harm from providing information that proves ultimately 
inaccurate must also be taken into consideration.
22  In short, the calculation of harm and 
benefit from genetic information is far from straightforward.  And because genetic 
information is seen as weightier and harder to understand, disclosure without 
accompanying genetic counseling is widely considered ethically problematic.
23 
The complicated calculus of the value of any particular bit of genetic information 
is, also, however, ultimately part of the inquiry into the scope of the duty, and it is 
discussed further infra in Part IV.   
 
II. The Legal Landscape and Other Sources of Guidance 
Most research with human subjects in the United States is subject to several layers 
of regulation.  Federal regulations set a floor of protections for human subjects, one that 
can be added to by state law from the legislature or the judiciary.  None of these sources 
of law, however, appears to directly address the question whether a researcher owes a 
legal duty to his subjects to disclose individual research findings.  Federal regulations 
address disclosure in the context of research, but the concern is primarily with harms that 
may occur during the research, as a result of taking part in it, rather than from a failure to 
                                                 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. (“Any disclosure of genetic information should be accompanied by appropriate counseling by trained 
genetic counselors.”). 12 
 
notify subjects of results that may indicate a susceptibility to a disease or adverse medical 
event.  The common law also has little guidance to offer on this topic.  
  
A.  The Common Rule 
Research with human subjects that (1) is supported by funding from the federal 
government or (2) takes place at an institution that is federally funded or (3) has as its 
purpose the support of an application to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is 
subject to federal regulation and oversight.
24 The practical effect of this is that nearly all 
research with human subjects in the United States is covered by the federal regulations 
known as the Common Rule.
25  Among other things, the Common Rule details the 
requirements for the informed consent process and establishes the system of protocol 
review by an Institutional Review Board (IRB).  Each covered institution must have at 
least one IRB, and before a covered researcher can work with human subjects he must 
gain approval for his protocol from an IRB, which functions as an (ideally) independent 
body charged with safeguarding the rights and welfare of human subjects by ensuring 
that the research meets federal standards.
 26   The Common Rule requires that the IRB 
evaluate whether the risks to subjects of the research are justified by its potential benefits 
and that potential subjects be fully informed about the nature, scope, and risks of the 
research.
27    
                                                 
24 See Henry Greely, The Control of Genetic Research: Involving the “Groups Between”, 33 Hous. L. Rev. 
1397, 1399 (1997). 
25 Barry Furrow et al., Health Law 980 (2d ed., 2000).  The Common Rule has been adopted by numerous 
agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) (45 C.F.R. 46), and the FDA 
(21 C.F.R. 50 and 56).  Although there are slight differences between the DHHS and the FDA versions of 
the Common Rule, none of those differences appear to be salient for this topic.  Accordingly, those 
differences will not be noted here, and for simplicity, the DHHS version will be cited throughout. 
26 Greeley, supra note24, at 1399-1400. 
27 Id. at 1400-1401. 13 
 
The Common Rule does not, however, directly address the provision of results to 
subjects, in general.  Section 46.116 of the Common Rule specifically addresses informed 
consent, and it states what must be disclosed to subjects as part of the consent process, 
including the purpose of the investigation and the potential risks and benefits from 
participation in the study.
28 A researcher’s plan with regards to sharing (or not sharing) 
results is not one of the items that must be disclosed; hence, the Common Rule does not 
compel the inclusion of such information in the consent form.  In fact, the only language 
in the Common Rule that addresses research results states that those that may indicate 
whether continued participation in the study is harmful must be revealed to subjects.
29  
Thus, federal regulatory law is clear that results indicating a risk from remaining in the 
study should be communicated to subjects, but it does not address whether results that 
might be clinically significant but would not affect willingness to continue in the research 
need to be disclosed. 
There are many examples of individual research findings – intended or incidental 
– that might affect a subject’s willingness to continue in a study.  For example, 
researchers who study couples where only one partner is infected with a sexually 
transmitted disease might discover that disease in the partner who was previously 
negative.  Such a finding would be very germane to the couple’s willingness to continue 
in the study.  Accordingly, the Common Rule would appear to compel such a disclosure.  
But many other research findings would not be so directly related to continued 
                                                 
28 45 C.F.R. § 46.116.  
29 § 46.116(b)(5)  (“(b) additional elements of informed consent. When appropriate, one or more of the 
following elements of information shall also be provided to each subject . . . (5) A statement that significant 
new findings developed during the course of the research which may relate to the subject's willingness to 
continue participation will be provided to the subject.”). 14 
 
participation in the study and would not, as a result, come within the scope of the 
Common Rule’s mandate to disclose.  And those are the focus here. 
Notably, the Common Rule prohibits any exculpatory language in the informed 
consent document that purports to release an investigator of liability: “No informed 
consent . . . may include any exculpatory language through which the subject or 
representative is made to waive . . . any of the subject’s legal rights, or releases or 
appears to release the investigator, the sponsor, the institution or its agents from liability 
or negligence.”
30  Therefore, a researcher is not absolved of liability merely by meeting 
the requirements of informed consent.
31 This provision may become particularly relevant 
should researchers increasingly seek to contract around a general duty to disclose.
32     
 
B.  HIPAA 
Regulations promulgated pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) may give subjects a right to access their individual 
research results under certain limited circumstances – if the information is kept in a 
“designated record set” by a “covered entity.”
33  Research involving clinical care, such as 
                                                 
30 § 46.116. 
31 See Larry Palmer, Reuschlein Lecture: Disease Management and Liability in the Human Genome Era,   
47 Vill. L. Rev. 1 (2002). 
32 See discussion infra Part V.A. 
33 United States Department of Health and Human Services, Clinical Research and the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule, at 1, 15 (2004), available at http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/clin_research.pdf (last accessed 
May 15, 2008) (“Covered entities are health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers 
that transmit health information electronically in connection with certain defined HIPAA transactions, such 
as claims or eligibility inquiries. Researchers are not themselves covered entities, unless they are also 
health care providers and engage in any of the covered electronic transactions. If, however, researchers are 
employees or other workforce members of a covered entity (e.g., a hospital or health insurer), they may 
have to comply with that entity's HIPAA privacy policies and procedures. Researchers who are not 
themselves covered entities, or who are not workforce members of covered entities, may be indirectly 
affected by the Privacy Rule if covered entities supply their data. . . .A designated record set includes any 
record that is maintained by the covered entity or its business associate that is a medical, billing, 
enrollment, or payment record or other record that is used to make decisions about the subject of the 15 
 
clinical trials, are more likely to meet these criteria, so subjects enrolled in clinical trials 
are more likely to have a right of access to their individual findings.  The actual number 
of research studies that would meet either condition is unclear; although it is likely that 
most would not – especially among those that do not involve clinical care – this remains 
an unresolved issue.
34  
Consent forms might seek to circumvent HIPAA requirements by explicitly 
stating that the results from the research will not become part of the subject’s medical 
records.  If results are not in the medical records, they will not be part of a ‘designated 
record set’; in those circumstances, HIPAA would appear to be inapplicable.  Even if 
results are entered into subjects’ medical records and thus become part of a ‘designated 
record set,’ the right conferred by HIPAA is, at least explicitly, only a right of access – 
individuals have the right to inspect and obtain a copy of their health care information – 
and it thus apparently requires only that the results be given upon request, not that 
subjects be informed of results as a matter of practice.  Moreover, because HIPAA does 
not create a private cause of action,
35 even if the researchers did violate these regulations, 
there would be no recourse for subjects in the courts (at least not in the federal courts). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
information. It may be, in some cases, that research data would not be considered part of the designated 
record set if, for example, the research data is not used to make decisions about the individual and not part 
of the medical record. In that case, the individual would not have a right to access the data, but this should 
be examined on a case-by-case basis with institutional officials.”). 
34 United States Department of Health and Human Services, Response of the Department of Health and 
Human Services to NBAC’s Report Research Involving Human Biological Materials: Ethical Issues and 
Policy Guidance, at 23 (2001), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/hbm/hbm.pdf (last accessed May 15, 
2008) ( [referring to HIPAA] “…its applicability to research in which health care is not provided (e.g., 
studies based solely on tissue samples with no clinical care component) is not entirely clear . . .”) 
(hereinafter “DHHS Response”). 
35 Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 2006). 16 
 
 
C.   Case Law 
Few published cases have addressed biomedical research at all, and only one 
published opinion appears to have addressed the issue of a failure to disclose results.  The 
court in that case did not, however, ultimately reach the issue of whether a researcher has 
a duty to disclose individual research findings.  Nonetheless, the decision is informative 
on several points.   
In Ande v. Rock,
36 the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin rejected claims related to a 
lack of disclosure of an individual research finding indicating that the plaintiffs’ child had 
cystic fibrosis (CF).  The litigation resulted from a research study intended to test 
whether early nutritional intervention would improve outcomes for children afflicted with 
CF.  The research design required a control group; therefore, only the parents of one-half 
of the children who tested positive for CF were notified, and only those children were 
afforded the early intervention.
37  The Andes’ daughter was randomly selected to be in 
the control group.
38  Accordingly, although she was tested for CF when she was born, and 
although the test indicated that she had CF, the Andes were not notified of the test 
result.
39  By the time their daughter was diagnosed with CF, almost two years later, the 
                                                 
36 647 N.W. 2d 265 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).  
37 Id. at 269.  This case thus introduces an additional potential wrinkle into the analysis of whether 
researchers should have a duty to disclose: some protocols, such as the one at issue in this case, will require 
that subjects not be told if they have a medical condition.  Full analysis of the implications of such 
protocols on any legal duty to disclose is beyond the scope of this paper, but it should be noted that, to the 
extent that a requirement that results not be reported is key to the research project, it may well tip any 
inquiry based on the totality of the circumstances against a duty to disclose in those particular 
circumstances.  In any event, the assumption here is that research requiring non-disclosure of a medically 
significant individual research finding is the rare exception. 
38 Id. at 270. 
39 Id.  Indeed, the research team maintained that they also did not know that the Andes’ daughter had tested 
positive for CF because newborns were randomized into control and experimental groups prior to testing 
and thus only the test results from the experimental group were actually viewed by any researchers.  In 
other words, although all children in the control group were tested, those test results were allegedly not 17 
 
Andes had already conceived their second child, and that child was also afflicted with 
CF.
40  The Andes sued, alleging, among other things, that they should have been 
informed that their first child had CF because doing so would have allowed them both to 
treat her earlier and to avoid conceiving another child with CF.
41  In their complaint, the 
Andes alleged both medical malpractice and general negligence.
42 
  The Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s dismissal of both the 
medical malpractice and the general negligence claims.  On the former issue, the court 
stated that there was no physician-patient relationship necessary for medical malpractice.  
And the court found that the negligence claim, which was based on the theory that 
researchers have a duty to disclose individual research findings, was time-barred.   
  Thus, the Ande court decision is not particularly illuminating.  But the case is still 
informative, for at least two reasons.  First, it serves as an indication that research 
subjects who do not receive notification of individual research findings will, in some 
instances, feel so aggrieved that they will litigate, and they might well pursue claim based 
on a theory of a researcher-based duty to disclose.  Second, it perhaps hints that courts 
might be reluctant to extend medical malpractice claims into the research context, at least 
in the context of a duty of disclosure.  Because the relationship between the plaintiffs and 
the physicians in this case was so attenuated, however – it appears that there was no 
relationship whatsoever between them
43 – the Ande court’s decision regarding the 
                                                                                                                                                
reviewed by any member of the research team until four years after the birth of the children.  Id.  An 
analysis of this ‘willful blindness’ defense might have proved useful in light of the potential increase in 
anonymization of research samples in response to a duty to disclose, see discussion infra in section V.B, 
but because the court found that the negligence claims against the researchers were time-barred, it did not 
explore this issue.  Id. at 270 & n.4.  
40 Id. at 270. 
41 Id. 
42 Id.  They also alleged deprivation of liberty and property interests as well as violations of due process.   
43 Id. at 272. 18 
 
medical malpractice claim might be primarily the result of the particular facts of the case 
and, accordingly, its significance should not be overstated.   
  There is some case law that addresses researcher duty, generally, and, it purports 
to establish several important propositions.  Most notably, the highest court in Maryland 
held, in Grimes v Kennedy Krieger Institute,
 44 that there usually is a legal duty of care in 
nontherapeutic research
45 and that a breach of this duty can give rise to a viable 
negligence action. According to the court, this duty results from both the special nature of 
the relationship between the researcher and subject and from the contractual nature of the 
informed consent document.
46  Although the court did not specify exactly what this duty 
entails nor the precise conditions under which it arises, it noted that the duty will 
normally exist in nontherapeutic research, that it cannot be extinguished by the consent of 
the subject or IRB approval, and that whether it exists in a particular study is to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.
47 The court also stated that the principal element of 
duty is foreseeability.
48  Thus, under Grimes, if the harm is foreseeable, there is likely a 
duty of care to help prevent the harm.   
There is a key difference between the Grimes case and the issue at present, 
however.  In the former, the researchers allegedly placed children in harmful situations 
(homes that had received partial lead-abatement but retained allegedly dangerous levels 
of lead) and kept them there despite knowledge of increased risk of harm (evidence 
revealed during the study of increased blood lead levels in children).  Thus, the research 
                                                 
44 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001). 
45 Nontherapeutic research is said to be distinct from clinical or therapeutic research in that it does not offer 
any possibility of benefit to the research subject.  The Grimes court noted that, because of this lack of 
benefit to the subject, the protections afforded subjects in nontherapeutic research should be, if anything, 
greater.  782 A.2d at 837-38. 
46 Id. at 858. 
47 Id. 
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itself was alleged to have harmed the subjects, and the court found that the informed 
consent provided was inadequate.  In contrast, when the issue is the disclosure of 
individual research findings, the research itself would not be directly harming the 
subjects.  Whether the duty of care described by the Grimes court would extend to 
include warning a subject of a potential harm that had been uncovered by the research is 
not clear.  But, at a minimum, Grimes establishes that researchers normally have a special 
relationship with their subjects and that they have duties to those subjects as a result.  




D.  Non-legal Guidance 
  The ethical foundation for the treatment of human subjects in research in this 
country comes primarily from three seminal documents: the Nuremberg Code,
50 the 
Declaration of Helsinki,
51 and the Belmont Report.
52  These documents are an obvious 
place to look for guidance on this issue, and some of the courts that have been faced with 
litigation arising from research have looked to them in the past.
53  But none of these three 
explicitly address whether researchers have an ethical obligation to disclose individual 
results to subjects.  Nonetheless, the principles contained in these documents do inform 
                                                 
49 Note, however, that Grimes is binding precedent only in Maryland.  It is also apparently the only 
decision to date that has specifically held that researchers owe subjects a duty of care based on a special 
relationship.  See Roger L. Jansson, Researcher Liability for Negligence in Human Subject Research: 
Informed Consent and Researcher Malpractice Actions, 78 Wash. L. Rev. 229, 255 (2003).  Thus, the 49 
remaining states and the federal courts do not necessarily recognize a similar duty of care in nontherapeutic 
research, and it is therefore unclear whether a non-Maryland court would find that the researcher owed his 
subject any duty of care whatsoever under common law.  
50Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 
(1949), available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html (last accessed May 15, 2008). 
51 Available at: http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b3.htm (last accessed May 15, 2008).. 
52 The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
(1979), available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/belmont.html (last accessed May 15, 2008). 
53 See, e.g., Grimes, 782 A.2d  807. 20 
 
the ethical discussion regarding results disclosure.  For example, the Nuremberg Code 
and the Belmont Report both place great importance on the principles of autonomy and 
respect for persons as the underlying reasons for the necessity of informed, voluntary 
participation in research, and this has been used as the basis for arguing that researchers 
should share research results with subjects more often.
54   
  Commentators generally support the notion that there is a moral duty to disclose 
medically important information.  Some base that duty primarily on the moral duty to 
rescue another in need,
55 while others focus on the professional identity of the researcher 
and the nature of his relationship with his subjects.
56  When the information is seen as 
potentially more harmful than helpful – as with some genetic information – there is more 
disagreement in the literature about whether the information should be disclosed.  But in 
situations where the research finding would have significant clinical utility to the subject, 
there appears to be broad agreement, based in large part on the principle of respect for 
persons, that there is a moral obligation to disclose.  But although a moral obligation 
might inform the legal debate, it does not equate to a legal duty. 
 
III.  Third-Party Physical Examinations and the Eroding Requirement for a Formal 
Physician-Patient Relationship 
 
  Because the law regarding research with human subjects is sparse, there are few 
clear guideposts.  Accordingly, a court faced with deciding whether a researcher should 
have a duty to disclose individually significant research findings might well look to other 
                                                 
54 See, e.g., Timothy Banks, Misusing Informed Consent: A Critique of Limitations on Research Subjects’ 
Access to Genetic Research Results, 63 Sask. L. Rev. 539 (2000). 
55 See, e.g., Henry S. Richardson & Leah Belsky, The Ancillary-Care Responsibilities of Medical 
Researchers, Hastings Center Report, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 26. 
56 See, e.g., Franklin G. Miller, et al., Incidental Findings in Human Research: What do Investigators owe 
Research Participants?, J.L. Med. & Ethics (forthcoming 2008). 21 
 
analogous areas of the law.  And in one such area, the breakdown of the traditional 
requirement for the formation of a formal physician-patient relationship as a prerequisite 
to a physician duty to disclose has been giving way to a more pragmatic approach that 
focuses on, among other things, the medical significance of the information and general 
policy considerations.  These legal developments point to a similar legal duty for 
researchers. 
  A strong argument against imposing liability on researchers for a failure to 
disclose individual research findings is that a researcher has no duty to his subjects – 
beyond those described in the Common Rule – because his interaction with them is not 
for their benefit but rather for the advancement of generalized knowledge.  Thus, because 
the researcher acts to further research rather than to benefit (directly) his subjects, his 
primary loyalty is the former, and his relationship with subjects is not fiduciary in 
character.  And his duties to subjects are therefore circumscribed by federal regulations.  
But this argument has been weakened in other contexts. 
  The traditional approach to third-party medical examinations supported this 
argument.  In third-party examinations, an employer or insurance company retains a 
doctor or other medical professional to examine a prospective (or current) employee or an 
applicant for insurance.
57  Because the doctor in such situations acts for the benefit of the 
employer or insurance company and not for the examinees, courts have traditionally 
found no physician-patient relationship between the doctor and examinee and, as a result, 
have found no duty to the examinee beyond exercising reasonable care in the course of 
                                                 
57 The physician might also, of course, be hired by a different third party.  But the case law has mostly 
addressed scenarios in which the third party is an employer or a life insurance company, suggesting that 
these are the most common scenarios. 22 
 
the examination.
58  Accordingly, examinees that were not notified of information that was 
discovered during the course of the third-party examination had no cause of action 
against the silent physician, even when such information was very medically significant. 
  But the traditional formalistic approach to these cases is waning, and the 
alternative approach that is gathering increased support signals that courts may be more 
sympathetic to the notion that researchers have a duty of disclosure.  The formalistic 
traditional rule has given way in many jurisdictions to a more pragmatic approach,
59 and 
the reasoning deployed by the courts in these jurisdictions appears amenable to 
application in the researcher-subject relationship.  Therefore, by analogy, the door has 
been opened such that, given the right set of facts, courts in some states are positioned to 
extend liability to researchers who fail to disclose individually meaningful research 
findings.  Many of these cases, however, exhibit a formalism of their own in their 
treatment of physicians, and such reasoning would be problematic if imported into the 
research context. 
 
A.  The Traditional Rule 
  The traditional rule requires a formal physician-patient relationship to establish a 
duty of care on the part of the physician.  Such a relationship is dependent “upon the 
existence of a contract, express or implied, that the doctor will undertake to treat the 
                                                 
58 E.g., Murphy v. Blum, 160 A.D.2d 914, 554 N.Y.S.2d 640 (App. Div. 1990); Payne v. Sherrer, 217 Ga. 
App. 761, 458 S.E.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1995).  See also Stanley v. McCarver, 208 Ariz. 219, 221 92 P.3d 849 
(2004) (“the traditional rule has been . . . that a formal doctor-patient relationship was necessary before tort 
liability could be imposed”). 
59 See Stanley, 208 Ariz. at 221 (“The requirement of a formalized relationship between the parties has been 
quietly eroding in several jurisdictions.”). 23 
 
patient or at least engage in diagnosis as a prelude to treatment[,]”
60 and requires that the 
purpose of the interaction is, ultimately, to benefit the patient.
61    
  Without the formalized relationship and its corresponding duty, the traditional 
rule views the physician as having no obligation to act to prevent harm to an individual.  
This stems from tort law’s traditional unwillingness to impose a general legal duty to 
rescue on individuals absent some particular relationship between parties imposing such a 
duty.
62  Thus, for example, a pedestrian who sees that a nearby blind man is about to step 
in front of a car has no legal duty to prevent the impending accident, even though it might 
require but little effort on his part,
63and, in the absence of duty, the pedestrian is not 
liable for negligence for failing to intervene to help the blind man.  Similarly, unless a 
physician has entered into the formal relationship with another party that establishes the 
latter as his patient, he has no legal duty to help or rescue that party, even if the physician 
possesses potentially life-saving information that could be disclosed with minimal 
burden. 
  Examples of the application of the traditional rule include terse opinions quickly 
concluding that no physician-patient relationship exists when the doctor has “neither 
offered nor intended to treat, care for, or otherwise benefit the individual[,]”
64 and that no 
duty to treat or examine attaches when the physician was not engaged to “treat or advise” 
the examinee.
65 
                                                 
60 Green v. Walker, 910 F.2d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 1990). 
61 See, e.g., Thomas v. Kenton, 425 So.2d 399 (La.App. 1982) (finding no physician-patient relationship 
because “[t]he doctor was hired by the company for their benefit and any benefit that their employees 
receive from having a doctor there to conduct these examinations was only secondary in nature.”). 
62 Rest. 2d Torts § 314 (1965). 
63 Id. at comment c. 
64 Payne v. Sherrer, 217 Ga. App. 761, 762 (Ga.App. 1995) (quoting Peace v. Weisman, 186 Ga.App. 697, 
698 (Ga.App. 1988) 
65 Murphy v. Blum, 160 A.D.2d 914, 915 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 1990). 24 
 
  Therefore, under the traditional approach – which is still the law in many states – 
a physician hired by a third party to perform a physical examination has no duty to the 
examinee beyond performing the examination with care (i.e. not harming the examinee 
during the course of the examination).  And thus, even if the doctor discovers very 
medically significant information about the examinee -- information that if conveyed to 
the examinee would allow the latter to act to prevent harm to himself -- he has no duty to 
convey it to the examinee.  And absent a duty, an examinee who later learns that the 
doctor’s inaction foreclosed an opportunity to prevent harm has no cause of action for 
negligence against the doctor.  Application of the traditional rule to the research context 
would seem to foreclose a duty on the part of the researcher because he, too, is not acting 
primarily for the benefit of his subjects.  Although the traditional rule would directly 
apply only to physician-researchers, if it is read more broadly, it can be taken to mean 
that an interaction with a professional is insufficient to give rise to a duty on the part of 
that professional when the point of that interaction is to benefit a third party.  And that 
reading supports the notion that researchers have no duty to disclose individual research 
findings to their subjects. 
 
B.  The Alternative Approach 
  The traditional rule regarding third-party examinations is changing, however, and 
with it the implications for researchers’ disclosure duties to their subjects.  In a number of 
jurisdictions, courts have been unwilling to rigidly apply the formal requirements of a 
physician-patient relationship when faced with preventable harm.   25 
 
  The breakdown of the strict requirement for a physician-patient relationship has 
its roots in two different areas of jurisprudence which each have established a willingness 
to impose duties on professionals flowing to persons other than the party with whom the 
professional interacts – Tarasoff and other duty to warn cases, on the one hand, and 
wrongful life actions, on the other.   
  The seminal case establishing a duty to warn a third party is Tarasoff v. Regents of 
California, in which the California Supreme Court held that a psychotherapist who had 
formed a treatment relationship with an individual had a duty to warn a third party of the 
patient’s stated intention to harm the third party, notwithstanding the lack of any 
relationship between the psychologist and the third party.
66  The most important element 
of that duty, the court determined, was the forseeability of the harm to the third party.
67  
Other factors that the court noted were relevant to the duty inquiry included the burden 
on the defendant, the consequences to the community, and the moral blame of the 
defendant’s conduct.
68  
  The duty to warn established in Tarasoff was subsequently expanded upon in the 
context of a physician-patient relationship involving genetic diagnoses and potential 
harms to family members.  In Safer v. Pack
69 and Pate v. Threlkel,
70 appellate courts in 
New Jersey and Florida, respectively, held that a doctor who treated a patient with a 
genetic condition had, under certain circumstances, a duty to the patient’s relatives to 
inform them of the patient’s condition and their corresponding risk.  Although the courts 
differed on how such a duty should be discharged – the Florida court held that the duty 
                                                 
66 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
67 Id. at 342.   
68 Id.   
69 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) 
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would be fulfilled merely by informing the patient of the potential familial implications,
71 
while the New Jersey court stated that, in certain circumstances, there might be a duty to 
inform the patient’s relative(s) directly
72 – they agreed that the lack of any physician-
patient relationship (or any contact whatsoever) between the physician and the patient’s 
family members was not dispositive and did not bar the finding of a duty running from 
the physician to his patient’s relatives.  
  Wrongful life jurisprudence has also, in some circumstances, helped set the 
groundwork for courts to reject the requirement of a traditional physician-patient 
relationship.  A wrongful life cause of action is one that is advanced on behalf of a child 
born with a disability against a physician who allegedly should have made the parents 
aware of their genetic status or the fetus’s disabling condition prior to conception or birth 
so that the parents could have chosen to not reproduce, to use technology to select against 
afflicted embryos, or to abort the afflicted fetus.  Essentially, a wrongful birth claim 
posits that the child would have been better off had he not been born.  Partly for that 
reason, most jurisdictions have refused to recognize a wrongful life cause of action.  But 
where wrongful life is recognized, it has helped establish the notion of a duty running to 
non-patient third parties.  Relying in part on either duty to warn or wrongful life 
jurisprudence, a number of courts have rejected the traditional rule in the context of both 
employment-related and life insurance physicals.
73   
  Many more courts have found a duty to disclose in the context of employment-
related physicals than in pre-insurance examinations, in part because the former tend to 
be conducted by physicians whereas the latter do not.  And the courts that reject the duty 
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to disclose where physicians are absent apply similar reasoning to those courts that 
impose duties on physicians when they are present: they both rely in part on a limited 
view of physicians in a manner that is insensitive to context.  And this mode of analysis 
would be problematic if applied to physician-researchers because it would ignore the 
different role played by a physician when she is a researcher and, in doing so, it would 
threaten to further blur the public’s already fuzzy understanding of research, with 
potentially problematic results.   
 
1. Employment-related Physical Examinations by Physicians
74 
   Numerous courts have now held that that, despite the traditional rule, physicians 
conducting employment-related physical examinations of employees (prospective or 
current) at the behest of employers have a duty to reveal important medical information
75 
discovered during the course of the examination to the examinee.   
The depths of analysis in these cases have varied considerably, but the courts tend 
to echo similar themes.  Two earlier cases relied heavily on the notion that examinees 
justifiably expect physicians to inform them of medically significant information 
regardless of whether the exam was for their own benefit.  In Green v. Walker,
76 the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Louisiana state law, relied in large part on the notion 
that when one places himself “in the hands of a person held out to the world as skilled in 
                                                 
74 Most, but not all, of the cases in this category involve physical examinations conducted prior to and as a 
prerequisite to employment.  But some involve physical examinations conducted after an individual has 
been working for an employer for a period of time, such as an annual exam. 
75 The precise description of the type of information that triggers such a duty varies from court to court, but 
each of the opinions deals with factual scenarios involving medical information that portends consequences 
that are both serious and preventable – at least to some extent – given knowledge of the information.   
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a medical profession”
77 he has a reasonable and justifiable expectation that the physician 
will notify him of “any incidental dangers that he discovers of which he is cognizant due 
to his peculiar knowledge of his specialization.”
78  And in Daly v. United States, a panel 
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Washington state law, held that 
physicians had a duty to notify examinees of “abnormal findings” discovered during the 
examination.
79  In reaching this conclusion, the court relied in part on Green’s reasoning 
regarding societal expectations of physicians.
80  More recently, state supreme courts in 
New Jersey and Arizona were particularly thorough in their respective analyses of the 
duty, but while both included other bases of support for finding a duty, both also relied in 
part on their perceptions of examinees’ expectations of physicians as healers.   
In Reed v. Bojarski, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a physician who 
conducts a third-party physical examination has a non-delegable duty to disclose 
significant medical findings to the examinee.
81  This duty, the court found, stemmed 
primarily from public policy considerations and expectations of physicians, which in turn 
was shaped in part by the “evaluative purpose” of the exam.
82  Ultimately, the court said, 
“whether a duty exists is . . . a question of fairness” involving “a weighing of the 
relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed 
solution.”
83  While the relationship between the parties is important, the court said, its 
exact nature is “simply a factor to be considered in determining what duty exists.”
84  But 
                                                 
77 Id. at 295-96 
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80 Id. at 1470-71, 
81 166 N.J. 89 (2001). 
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by focusing on society’s expectations of physicians, the court may have limited its 
holding to relationships involving medical doctors. 
The Arizona Supreme Court arguably extended the duty to disclose one step 
further by imposing a duty on a radiologist who apparently had no direct contact with the 
examinee.  In Stanley v. McCarver, the court held that a radiologist who examined x-rays 
of an employee’s chest had a duty to notify the employee of an abnormality that indicated 
a potentially life-threatening condition – lung cancer.
85  In reaching its decision, the 
Stanley court noted several things of potential relevance to the researcher-subject 
relationship.  First, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that imposing a duty 
would open the floodgates to litigation and would thereby chill physicians from 
performing pre-employment physicals.
86  In a related point, the court suggested that 
physicians could deal with this issue via contract, by, for example, requiring as a 
condition of performing the examination that examinees consent to having the results 
reported only to the employer.
87 Also, to allay concerns about a general duty to rescue, 
the court stated that it was not imposing a duty solely because a physician is in a position 
to prevent future harm.  Instead, the court found that the duty “emanates from the 
panoply of social concerns that generally inform tort law”
88 and suggested that such 
concerns included an individual’s expectations when he interacts with a physician, 
whether the party in possession of the information is in a unique position to prevent harm, 
and general considerations of public policy.
89 
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Two themes emerge from the cases dealing with employment-related physicals.  
First, courts have tended to formalistically focus on the fact that the party possessing the 
information was a physician, and they have imputed expectations accordingly, without 
examining the particular, context-specific role of the physician at the time of the 
examination.  None of the decisions discussed in this section undertook an in-depth 
discussion of the interaction between the doctor and examinee, nor did they indicate what 
the particular examinee’s expectations actually were or whether he signed a consent form 
acknowledging that the doctor had no duty.  Importantly, this focus on physicians 
arguably limits the duty to medical doctors.  Second, courts tend to engage in broad 
inquiries when evaluating whether a duty should attach and thus consider a number of 
factors, including the burden on the physician to disclose the information, the seriousness 
of the information, whether the physician was in a unique position to prevent harm, and 
often ill-defined general policy or social concerns. 
   
2.  Pre-Insurance Physicals 
  Most of the court decisions that have addressed the duty to disclose in the context 
of pre-insurance physical examinations -- which typically do not involve physicians -- 
have indicated that the physician-based limits hinted at by the courts in the employment-
related physicals cases will be taken seriously.  These decisions, too, are hampered by a 
formalistic, narrow view of physicians, a view that would be problematic were it 
imported into the research context. 
For example, a New Jersey appellate court decision after Reed indicated – but did 
not affirmatively state – that the key bases for the holding in Reed were the presence of a 31 
 
physician and the examinee’s corresponding expectations.  In Nolan v. First Colony Life 
Insurance Company,
90 the court declined to extend Reed beyond the context of a 
physician in a pre-employment physical and thus refused to impose an analogous duty for 
a pre-insurance examination in part because no physician was involved.  The facts in 
Nolan, however, varied in other potentially significant ways from those in Reed, such that 
it is not ultimately clear whether a lack of physician involvement in the former was the 
dispositive factor.  For example, in Nolan, there were no significant “abnormalities” 
revealed in the blood test conducted for the insurance company – it revealed only slightly 
elevated liver enzyme levels.
91   Furthermore, the Nolan court noted that the “commercial 
setting” in which the pre-insurance testing took place precluded a trust or reliance similar 
to that in Reed.
92  Thus, Nolan interprets the holding in Reed to be based in no small part 
on the expectations that people have in physicians, but because the ultimate decision in 
Nolan rested on a combination of factors beyond the absence of a physician, it is not 
entirely clear what the court would have done had there been, for example, no physician 
in the mix but clearer evidence of a pressing medical problem, or, perhaps, a less 
“commercial” setting – like research. 
  Similar reasoning has produced similar results in other pre-insurance examination 
cases.
 93  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Deramus v. Jackson Nat. Life Ins. Co.,  
drew a strong duty-related distinction between situations in which a physician was 
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91 Id. at 150. 
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involved and those with no medical doctor.
94  Relying in part on the reasoning in 
Deramus, a federal district court in Ohio declined to impose a common law duty to notify 
an applicant that his blood had tested for positive for HIV on either the insurance 
company, because “the relationship between an insurance company and an applicant is 
commercial, not medical[,]” or the company that employed the paramedical who 
examined the plaintiff, in part because the examiner was not a physician.
95  And in 
Petrosky v. Brasner, a state appellate court in New York found no duty on an insurance 
company in part based on the conclusion that the fact that the plaintiff was not examined 
by a physician meant that he could not have forseeably been induced to forego necessary 
treatment
96 -- the implication being that, had a physician been present for the 
examination, the plaintiff would justifiably have had much different expectations. 
  There is thus a body of law from what I will refer to as the “physician-centered 
cases” that bases the duty to disclose individually significant medical information 
discovered during the course of a third-party medical examination at least partly on the 
status of the examiner – i.e. whether she is a physician.  But this bit of formalism is also 
showing signs of giving way to a more pragmatic and context-sensitive approach, and 
this latter mode of analysis ultimately holds more promise for application in the research 
context. 
  The latter type of analysis is demonstrated in minority opinions in two of the 
cases that held no duty in the context of pre-insurance physicals.  The concurring opinion 
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in Nolan
97rejected the majority’s conclusion that insurance companies have no duty to 
disclose abnormal findings and stressed that “tort duties arise from the qualities of a 
relationship not the status of the parties.”
98  The Nolan concurrence also rejected the idea 
that a cause of action for an increased risk of harm  should be limited to the medical 
malpractice context; instead, in the concurring judge’s view, it should also apply to other 
types of special relationships.
99  Similarly, the dissenting judge in Petrosky flatly rejected 
the notion that the existence of a duty should turn on whether the examiner was a 
physician and noted the incentive problem that such a rule would create – limiting the 
duty to circumstances in which a physician was involved would encourage insurance 
companies and other third parties to employ non-physicians to conduct examinations and 
interpret the results.
100  This nascent development in the law – it is probably premature to 
identify it as a trend – has important implications for researchers because it suggests that 
at least some judges are willing to see beyond the physician-based limits of the cases 
involving employment-related physicals and extend the duty to disclose to other parties.   
  Similar logic convinced a majority in one court to impose a duty to disclose 
important medical information in the context of physical examinations conducted 
pursuant to an application for life insurance.  In Pehle v. Farm Bureau Life Insurance 
Company,
101 a divided three judge panel
102 of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that, under Wyoming law, a life insurance company had a duty to notify an applicant 
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when a blood test conducted pursuant to his application for life insurance revealed that 
the applicant was HIV-positive.   
  Pehle can be seen as an important extension of the law towards researcher 
liability for at least two reasons.  First, the court imposed a duty on an insurance 
company, rather than a physician.  In doing so, the court discounted the importance of the 
traditional role of the party holding the information, a factor that loomed large in the 
analysis of the physician-centered cases.  In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit panel stated 
that, “[w]e do not think that insurance companies must exist to treat or diagnose HIV in 
order for a duty to arise that necessitates that applicants be properly put on notice to 
inquire further.”
103  Thus, Pehle arguably removes the physician-based barrier to duty left 
by Reed and Stanley.  In the course of doing so, it also signaled the contours of a new 
limit by declining to impose a duty on the laboratory that tested the plaintiff’s blood, 
finding the relationship between the applicant and the laboratory to be “so attenuated”; 
the insurer, by contrast, had a “good deal of contact” with plaintiff.
104  
  Second, the Pehle court based its decision in large part upon a notion that duty 
could arise based on a relationship of “trust and confidence” and, importantly, found that 
the relationship between an insurer and a prospective insured had such a quality.
105  This 
latter aspect of the holding seems dubious, especially insofar as it relies on the tenuous 
claim that an insurer acts to benefit its customers.  But to the extent that it implies that the 
possession of individual A’s confidential information by party B is sufficient to create a 
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relationship of trust and confidence
106-- or perhaps that such a relationship is created 
when A gives permission to B to test his blood and learn confidential information – Pehle 
suggests that researchers might too have such a duty.  In fact, the argument for a duty to 
disclose based on the nature of the relationship would appear to be much stronger in the 
context of the researcher-subject interaction than it is for the association between 
prospective insured and insurer.
107 
  Despite the problems with the assertion that the insured-prospective insurer 
relationship is one of trust and confidence, the Pehle court – and the judges in the 
minority in Petrosky and Nolan – arguably approach the issue of duty more sensibly, by 
refusing to narrowly focus on the traditional role of the examining party, because the 
traditional role inquiry should not be dispositive.  The traditional role might well factor in 
to the ultimate question of expectations, of course, but one problem with the physician-
centered opinions is that they fail to acknowledge that physicians may play different 
roles, and that our expectations of them should vary with those roles. Yes, physicians do 
hold themselves out to the world as healers, but that is not all that they do.  Physicians 
sometimes act in other roles – as scientists, for example – and when they are wearing the 
scientist hat, their professional role is different and expectations should be adjusted 
accordingly.   
This argument is not meant to suggest that the employment-related decisions were 
wrongly decided on the merits, however.  There are legitimate justifications for imposing 
a duty on physicians in the context of employment-related physicals – and some of the 
decisions discussed above relied in part of such justifications.  But tying that duty to the 
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physician’s professional role—as if she has only one function that is the same in all her 
endeavors – is problematic because it ignores context and potentially hampers 
physicians’ ability to engage in other pursuits.   
Research exacerbates the tension in the physician-centered decisions and further 
highlights the pitfalls of their approach.  Applying traditional role-based rationales for 
duty in the research context would be particularly troubling, given the prevalence of 
physician-researchers and the difficulty that many research subjects already have 
understanding that the purpose of the research is not to help them directly but to advance 
general knowledge.  This phenomenon, the therapeutic misconception,
108 is already 
widespread, and importing the reasoning from the physician-centered cases into the 
research context threatens to further exacerbate subjects’ misunderstanding, which could 
in turn further erode public trust in research.
109   
So, in one sense, although Pehle arguably takes significant steps toward 
researcher liability, physician-researchers may ultimately find it to be a preferable frame 
through which to view researcher liability lawsuits, because by focusing on the actual 
role of the party with the information in the particular context of his interaction with the 
subject rather than narrowly deferring to the traditional role, the Pehle approach might 
actually provide more protection from liability, at least for those researchers who are also 
physicians.  But at the same time, it threatens to open a new door to a duty to disclose on 
non-physician researchers, especially insofar as it sets forth an especially expansive view 
of relationships of trust and confidence. 
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  Of course, to say that Pehle’s frame of looking at the issue is better is not an 
endorsement of Pehle’s ultimate conclusion about the relationship between insured and 
insurers, which is both unconvincing and unsupported.  Thus, to the extent that Pehle 
opens the door to a finding of a relationship of trust and confidence in many and varied 
interactions (and, of course, to the extent that the decision gains any traction – which 
does not yet appear to be the case) its reasoning has the potential to lead to the 
application of many more – perhaps too many more – duties to rescue.   
 
C.  Application to researchers 
The rationale for a duty to disclose medically significant information in the 
context of third-party physical examinations applies with at least equal force in the 
context of a researcher-subject relationship.  There are, of course, significant differences 
between the nature of the interaction between the examiner and examinee in third-party 
physicals and the general relationship between researchers and subjects.  And, 
admittedly, not all of these differences point in the direction of a stronger argument for 
researcher duty.  Furthermore, there are also very significant differences among research 
protocols regarding the level and type of researcher-subject interaction.  In general, 
however, the case for researcher duty is potentially stronger than that for third-party 
examiner duty, for several reasons. 
 
1.  Nature of the Relationship 
  First, a researcher and subject have, by virtue of their interaction, entered into a 
relationship that already imposes duties on the researcher, such as those outlined in the 38 
 
Common Rule.  Imposing a duty to disclose individual research findings on researchers  
thus would not be akin to grafting a duty onto a relationship that previously had none.  
Rather, as in Tarasoff, Safer, and Pate, layering the duty on top of pre-existing 
relationship-based duties both makes more sense from an expectations-based viewpoint 
and is less troublesome because it inherently limits the duty to rescue.   
Arguably, however, the researcher-subject relationship is not dissimilar from the 
relationship between examiner and examinee in the context of third-party physicals, 
because the latter, too, involves at least a minimal duty (to not harm the examinee during 
the course of the examination).  But the researcher-subject relationship has an 
importantly different quality.  For example, commentators disagree over whether a 
researcher is in a fiduciary relationship with his subjects.  One argument that the 
relationship is fiduciary, at least when the investigator is also a physician, draws on the 
uncertain state of the term ‘fiduciary’ in the law and the vesting of discretionary powers 
by the subject in the physician-researcher.
110  And one court has hinted that it might 
consider the relationship to be fiduciary.
111  Others, however, posit that the relationship 
cannot be fiduciary because the researcher’s primary loyalty is to his protocol rather than 
to any one subject.
112  A resolution of this disagreement is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but two points are important to note here.  First, the existence of this academic dispute 
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suggests that the nature of the researcher-subject relationship is one that has at least some 
fiduciary qualities, and, accordingly, should have both heightened duties and 
expectations.  Second, the relationship does not have to rise to the fiduciary level for duty 
to attach – it need only satisfy the lower bar of a special relationship.  And while the 
disagreement about whether the researcher-subject relationship is fiduciary focuses 
primarily on situations in which the researcher is also a physician, the interaction between 
non-physician researchers and their subjects in nontherapeutic research has already been 
characterized by one court as just such a special relationship.
113  Thus, because the 
researcher-subject relationship is possibly fiduciary and probably “special,” it is 
qualitatively different than the interaction between examiner and examinee in third-party 
physicals. 
The second reason that the argument for a duty to disclose is stronger in the 
research context is that the fundamental nature of the relationship between researcher and 
subject is different because each party involved is not acting either solely for his own 
benefit or to protect another’s financial interests.  When a doctor examines a person for 
the benefit of a third party, he is acting for himself and for the third party, but not for the 
examinee.  And the examinee submits to the examination for self-interested reasons – 
namely, so that he can obtain or keep a job.  The interaction with a life insurance 
company is essentially an arms-length transaction in the marketplace.  The insurance 
company acts for profit, and one seeking insurance acts to protect his family.  The 
insurance company examines to protect its own interests: the results of the examination 
are used to inform the decision whether to offer life insurance and, if so, what rate to 
charge for it.    
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  The researcher-subject relationship is fundamentally different – it is not an arms-
length transaction.   This is so for at least two reasons.  First, neither party acts solely in 
his own interests.  The researcher acts in part to further his own career, to be certain, but 
he also acts to benefit society by advancing the state of knowledge.  And the Common 
rule obliges him to consider his subjects’ interests when he acts.
114 Subjects generally 
volunteer for research, at least in part, for unselfish reasons.
115  It is true that, in clinical 
research, the subjects often act at least in part because they hope for direct personal 
benefit.  But most subjects are motivated at least somewhat by an altruistic desire to help 
advance societal interests.
116  And their involvement also directly helps advance the 
personal professional interests of the researcher.  In short, neither researcher nor subject 
can be said to act wholly for himself.   
 Furthermore, there is an element of quid pro quo at work: because the subject 
helps the researcher, the former might have a legitimately heightened expectation that the 
researcher would at the very least, alert him to medically significant information in 
return.  In some real sense, then, the relationship between researcher and subject is closer 
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to a cooperative or joint enterprise rather than an arms-length transaction.  And although 
it might stretch credulity to suggest that the law of business partnerships should govern 
the researcher-subject relationship, it seems reasonable to assert that, because partnership 
law requires of each partner a duty to act on the other’s behalf,
117 and because the 
relationship between researcher and subject is, on the spectrum between arm’s-length 
relationships and partnerships, at the very least closer to partnerships than are the 
relationships in the third-party examination context, the argument for duty in the former 
context is stronger.  
 
2.  Other Factors  
  Other factors cited by the courts in support of imposing a duty in the context of 
third-party physical examinations also suggest that a similar duty should be imposed on 
researchers.  For example, the burden on the researcher to disclose an individual research 
finding will often be minor, especially in comparison to the potential benefit to the 
subject – merely notifying the subject in writing would likely suffice.  The provision of 
some data might be more burdensome – genetic data, for example, arguably should only 
be provided in tandem with genetic counseling.
118  And thus the burden might not be 
uniformly low.  But even so, the burdens are likely to pale in comparison to the benefits – 
again, assuming a finding with a high degree of clinical utility, similar to those discussed 
in the third-party examination cases, and also assuming that the duty could be discharged 
by simply informing the subject of the finding and would not entail any subsequent 
obligation to treat or refer.   
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Like the doctors or insurance companies in the third-party physicals cases, 
researchers who discover individually significant research findings would be in a unique 
position to prevent harm.  In fact, this consideration potentially weighs even more in 
favor of a duty to disclose in the research context, because a given individual research 
finding might be both completely unknown and unknowable by anyone outside the 
particular research team.  For example, when genetic researchers make an initial 
discovery that a particular gene is linked with a higher incidence of a disease, they alone 
possess that knowledge, at least prior to sharing or publication.  In such a circumstance, a 
subject with the relevant genotype could not possibly learn the salient information from 
any source other than the researcher.  Once the discovery is published, of course, the 
information becomes widespread.  But even then, an individual who wishes to learn if he 
in fact possesses such a gene might not be able to acquire that information elsewhere – in 
some circumstances, the test for the gene might be possessed exclusively by the 
researchers.  Alternatively, a researcher might employ a test for a gene that is widely 
available but is prohibitively expensive.
119  This, too, increases the likelihood that the 
researcher alone will have either the knowledge of the genetic disorder or the ability to 
discover it.  Thus, to the extent that the “unique position to prevent harm” foundation for 
a duty to disclose is taken seriously, it arguably weighs more heavily toward a duty on 
researchers than on third-party examiners because, at least in some circumstances, 
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researchers will, by virtue of their exclusive knowledge of the underlying scientific 
connection, actually be uniquely positioned to prevent harm. 
 
3.  Variables in the Research Context 
  The value of any particular individual research finding will vary widely, but that 
does not argue against the imposition of a duty, generally.  For example, genetic 
researchers may learn that a subject has a genotype that predisposes him to only a slightly 
higher risk of developing a disease.  Or a blood test may reveal slightly elevated levels of 
an enzyme that do not rise to the level of a clinical problem.  In short, much of the 
individual information learned by researchers may have little or no clinical utility.  But 
such variations in the clinical utility of individual information are not unique to research.  
Information learned during the course of third-party examinations will vary similarly.  
Thus, that much of the information learned during research will have limited clinical 
utility is not an argument against researcher duty per se but rather only an argument that 
such a duty will present in only limited circumstances.  In any event, even extending a 
duty to less clinically useful information would likely be of little consequence, because 
absent clinical utility, the remaining elements of a negligence claim will likely not be 
met.
120   
  What potentially matters more is that the nature of research relationships varies 
widely, and to the extent that the nature of the relationship shapes subjects’ expectations, 
so too might the latter be expected to vary.  At one extreme, we can imagine a subject 
whose involvement in a research protocol is limited to the donation of tissue for 
genotyping and the filling out of a questionnaire regarding his demographic information 
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and perhaps his medical history.  Such a scenario is likely commonplace among many 
types of population genetics studies.
121  Relationships in research can also be much more 
involved, however.  Researchers may, for example, work closely with a particular family 
-- genotyping numerous family members, acquiring detailed personal information about 
each family member, and following up over time to learn more about the family 
members’ medical developments.  A researcher might also, of course, be a physician 
from whom his subjects receive care, perhaps over a long time period and for very 
serious medical conditions. 
  Ultimately, however, although the variation in research relationships should be 
considered, it probably should not be dispositive, because there are elements present in 
all researcher-subject relationships that alone arguably merit the imposition of a duty 
when information is discovered that bears on the health of the subject.  For example, the 
relationship between researcher and subject is a professional one wherein consent is 
given for the researcher to have privileged access to private information, and, furthermore 
the researcher has received permission to impose upon his subjects at least in part for his 
own benefit.
122  Considered together with the fact that the researcher will likely be in a 
unique position to prevent harm and that burden of disclosure will often be relatively 
slight, especially as compared to the level of harm that could be avoided, this suggests 
that although the extent of the relationship between the researcher and subject should be a 
factor to consider, it should not be dispositive.  And for these same reasons, neither 
should variations in the researcher’s professional identity – whether she is a physician. 
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  In fact, whether a researcher has a medical degree arguably ought not to matter in 
the analysis of duty.  Notwithstanding Pehle, however, most courts that have imposed a 
duty on physicians in third-party physicals appear to have limited their holdings to 
physicians.  Therefore, it might be asserted that the application to the research context 
should vary widely depending on whether the researcher was also a physician.  But 
limiting the duty to physicians and basing it on their traditional role is especially 
problematic in the research context because it is illogical and it further muddies the 
already cloudy clinical research waters at a time when clarity is needed to promote the 
sorely needed public trust in the research enterprise.   
  There are several reasons why the professional status of the information holder – 
i.e. whether she is a medical doctor – might matter, but none convincingly demonstrate 
that the legal obligations regarding the disclosure of research findings should be different 
for non-physician researchers than for researchers who are also medical doctors.  A 
physician’s professional role qua physician is, of course, fundamentally different from 
the role of a researcher.  A physician is a healer of individuals; a scientist is a generator 
of generalizable knowledge.  But this overlooks that a physician is not acting in the role 
of a healer when she dons the researcher hat – in that case, she is a scientist, whose 
primary loyalty is to the protocol, just like non-physician researchers.  Hence the 
argument that physician-researchers, and researchers generally, are not in a fiduciary 
relationship with their subjects.
123  
  One reason that the professional identity of the researcher might matter is that a 
physician might plausibly be expected to have superior capacity to interpret the medical 
significance of certain research findings.  This is undoubtedly true in many situations – a 
                                                 
123 See Morreim, supra note 112. 46 
 
physician has the professional training to diagnose, while the non-physician scientist 
generally lacks such ability.  But in some circumstances, medical training may be neither 
necessary nor even helpful to the determination whether an individual finding merits 
disclosure.  For example, when the research finding is not a medical diagnosis but rather 
a probabilistic assessment of risk, an M.D. is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
calculating the odds.  And thus, when it comes to interpreting epidemiological data 
regarding possible linkages between a gene and a disease, for example, the investigator 
who is trained in interpreting such data should have a superior capacity for interpretation.  
Therefore, the superior capacity argument does not clearly cut either way; rather, it is 
context-dependent. 
  Research subjects might, however, have significantly different expectations about 
the provision of results based on whether the investigator is a physician or a scientist.  
This is particularly likely to be true when a subject is in a preexisting patient-physician 
relationship with the investigator.  The question, though, is whether we should encourage 
or discourage such expectations.  Therapeutic misconception, wherein research subjects – 
particularly those involved in clinical trials – falsely believe that the point of the research 
is to help them individually, is already both quite common and difficult to eradicate.
124  
Because physicians and non-physicians are in the same professional role when they act in 
their capacities as researchers, encouraging differential expectations based on the 
professional identity of the researcher is unwise, in part because it threatens to further 
exacerbate therapeutic misconceptions, which in turn risks furthering public distrust of 
research and, ultimately, could lead to less participation in research.
 125  
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  Instead, the presence or absence of a legal duty to disclose individual research 
findings should turn on factors other than the professional identity of the investigator.
126  
In essence, misguided expectations should not be the basis for duty.  Although the 
therapeutic misconception is widespread, it is nevertheless erroneous.  And basing a duty 
to disclose on misguided expectations of physician-researchers is just that – misguided.   
  In sum, the rationales put forth in the third-party physicals cases for imposing a 
duty resonate even more in the research context.  But the particular reasoning of the 
physician-centered cases should not be imported into the researcher-subject relationship, 
in part because doing so would threaten to exacerbate the therapeutic misconception and 
subsequently further undermine already eroding public understanding of and trust in 
research.  The minority opinions in Petrosky and Nolan and the majority opinion in Pehle 
provide a better approach for analyzing a duty to disclose in the research context, one that 
focuses on, among other things, the nature of the relationship rather than just the 
professional status of the examiner.  The nature of the relationship between researcher 
and subject can vary a great deal, and those differences in research relationships should 
inform the duty inquiry, but they should not be dispositive, because even limited research 
relationships have sufficient qualities that they should arguably entail a duty to disclose. 
   
IV.  Other Elements of Negligence 
The practical effect of a duty for researchers to disclose individual research 
findings would likely be somewhat limited, because establishing that researchers have a 
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duty to disclose individual research findings is only a first – albeit critical – step to 
establishing negligence-based liability for a failure to disclose.  And just as the question 
of duty would present a new challenge for courts, so, too, would establishing the other 
elements of the negligence action – a breach of the duty that was the proximate cause of 
cognizable harm. 
 
A. Scope of Duty 
The first step in establishing a breach of a duty to disclose would be a 
determination of the scope of the duty.  And this determination could be quite knotty.  In 
medical malpractice cases, courts look to experts to establish the standard of care.  Courts 
faced with a claim of researcher negligence might also look outside the courtroom for 
expert advice on the scope of the duty, and they therefore might look to the statements of 
various prominent organizations that have grappled with the question of when individual 
research findings should be revealed.  But this field is still unsettled.  A significant 
portion of research with human subjects is probably unlikely to generate individual 
research that would fall within the scope of a duty to disclose, even if such scope were 
broadly defined.  But there are also many potential findings that might fall within the 
gray areas between those with clear medical significance, such as the discovery of a brain 
mass or a positive test for HIV, and those that are so preliminary that they lack even 
internal validity. 
In the context of genetic information, where concerns based on the principle of 
nonmaleficence and stemming from potential harms from probabilistic genetic 
information, counter autonomy-based arguments for disclosure, several prominent 49 
 
organizations have issued guidelines that seek to address the tension between the two 
principles by respecting both.  Perhaps most prominently, The National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission (NBAC) put forth specific recommendations addressing whether 
and under what circumstances individual genetic results should be disclosed.
127 NBAC 
stated that IRBs should develop general guidelines for the disclosure of results, and that 
these guidelines should reflect that disclosure should only happen under the following 
circumstances:
128 
1.  the findings are scientifically valid and confirmed, 
2.  the findings have significant implications for the subject’s health 
concerns, and 
3.  a course of action to ameliorate or treat these concerns is readily 
available. 
 
In essence, these three conditions describe results that have clinical utility -- some way to 
improve a subjects’ health.  If results have no clinical utility because they fail to meet any 
of the three criteria, NBAC considers the harm from disclosing such results to be greater 
than any good that might result.  If, however, results have significant implications for 
health and there is something that can be done about the concerns, the equation favors the 
good that will result from disclosure over potential harms.  Although there appears to be 
no empirical evidence available to gauge the extent to which the guidelines from NBAC 
are heeded, there is some anecdotal evidence suggesting that they are seen as 
authoritative, perhaps because they are one of the few sources of guidance that is directly 
relevant to this issue and because of the prominent stature of NBAC.
129 Because these 
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guidelines favor non-disclosure except in unusual circumstances, it could be argued that 
if those circumstances are met, disclosure should happen.  However, these 
recommendations do not actually state that disclosure of results should or must happen 
under any circumstances; rather, they merely state that disclosure should not happen if 
any of the three of the criteria are not met. 
Similar guidelines were issued late in 2004 by a working group from The 
National Heart, Blood, and Lung Institute (NHLBI), whose main objective was to 
“…discuss and make recommendations for reporting individual results from genetic tests 
to participants of Heart, Lung, Blood and Sleep research studies involving genetics.”
130 
Although the guidelines were thus only intended to apply directly to research under the 
auspices of NHBLI, the size and stature of this organization make these suggestions 
noteworthy nonetheless. The working group unanimously agreed on three key criteria 
that must be met before results can be reported to participants and their physicians and 
stated that if these criteria are met, results should generally not be withheld:
131 
1.  The risk for the disease should be significant, i.e. relative risk >2.0. 
Variants with greater penetrance or associated with younger age of onset 
should receive priority 
2.  The disease should have important health implications, i.e. fatal or 
substantial morbidity or should have significant reproductive implications 
3.  Proven therapeutic or preventive interventions should be available 
 
The working group also concluded that decisions about reporting results should not be 
made solely by the investigator and should be done only with IRB approval.   
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The NHLBI guidelines are thus very similar to those propagated by NBAC five 
years prior.  Although NHLBI tries to provide a bit more advice about how a 
determination of ‘important health implications’ should be made, they still rely on vague 
terms like “substantial morbidity” and “significant reproductive implications.”  Thus, 
even if these recommendations are followed, there remains significant room for 
interpretation within the determination of whether specific results should be disclosed.    
There is also at least one notable difference between NBAC and NHBLI.  The 
latter organization’s recommendations stated that if the three criteria are met, “…results 
generally should not be withheld.”
132  This is a perhaps significant deviation from the 
NBAC guidelines, which, as noted earlier, did not include any language actually urging 
disclosure.  
Perhaps in recognition of these outstanding unresolved issues, NHLBI made 
another relevant recommendation: “DHHS should issue formal, uniform guidance for 
IRBs, institutions, investigators and sponsors with respect to best practices for testing and 
reporting genetic results in human research studies.”
133  Indeed, were DHHS to take this 
suggested step, it would not only eliminate much of the guesswork that researchers and 
IRBs must now face, it would also provide a much firmer basis to which a court could 
look if faced with the task of determining the scope of a duty to disclose in the research 
setting. 
NBAC and NHLBI both set the bar for disclosure at (or near) clinical utility, but 
this recommendation is not without its critics.  In particular, a working group from the 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) offered a notable critique.  This 
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group, which was convened specifically to study the recommendations in the 1999 
NBAC report, issued its response in 2001.  Included in that response were the following 
concerns about the second and third criteria for disclosure:
134 
The Working Group is persuaded that individuals have differing personal 
perspectives about whether information has ‘significant implications’ for 
their own health . . . .  Furthermore, even if there is no prevention or 
treatment measure that the researcher or IRB judges to be effective, 
having this information may allow the subject to make certain life 
choices or to engage in an intervention or additional research that the 
subject believes may be helpful. 
 
Thus, the DHHS working group was clearly uncomfortable with the high bar for 
disclosure set by the NBAC report, and by the fact that the decision-making regarding 
disclosure would, were the NBAC guidelines to be followed, not take any personal 
preferences of the subjects into consideration.  And the recommendations from NHLBI 
fall short of addressing these concerns.  In fact, the criteria that most troubled DHHS (the 
second and third criteria for disclosure in the NBAC report) are essentially the same as 
criteria #2 and #3 in the NHLBI report.  The DHHS working group recommended 
convening yet another working group to address these concerns, but a review of relevant 
sources gives no indication that this has yet come to pass. 
  Alzheimer’s disease (AD) offers an illuminating example of these competing 
considerations.  At least one research team utilized the NBAC guidelines in deciding not 
to disclose to its subjects genetic information regarding an increased risk for AD, 
concluding that because the disease was not preventable or treatable, such information 
would have no clinical utility, and thus the harms from learning such information, such as 
increased anxiety, outweighed the minimal benefits.
135 But recent data suggests that the 
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harms from such disclosures might be overstated and the benefits understated.
136  And at-
home kits that test for a genetic predisposition to Alzheimer’s disease are now 
commercially available, indicating that there may be a demand for genetic information 
lacking in clinical utility – i.e. that at least some people want to know if they are 
genetically predisposed to a disease, even when there are no proven preventative steps 
that can be taken.  All of this undermines the argument that only information deemed 
clinically useful is more helpful than harmful.  And it may ultimately convince 
organizations like NBAC or NHLBI to reassess their assertions that clinical utility is the 
proper threshold for reporting.  It seems unlikely, however, that it will ultimately affect 
the legal determination of the scope of a duty to disclose – at least not unless tort law 
changes to encompass broader notions of harm. 
Thus, in spite of its deficiencies, the bar of clinical utility is at least legally 
defensible and is a plausible parameter for the scope of a duty to disclose.  If an 
individual research finding lacked clinical utility, it would be difficult for an individual to 
demonstrate that a tangible harm resulted from not being informed of such finding, and if 
the failure to disclose was not the proximate cause of tangible harm, a critical element of 
negligence would be missing.  Thus, NBAC and NHLBI have provided guidelines that, if 
followed, would seem to protect a researcher from liability if the determination of clinical 
utility is proper.   
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A vexing problem, remains, however: the determination whether a particular 
individual research finding has clinical utility may often be far from simple, and the 
likelihood that such determinations would be made by the researchers, either alone or in 
consultation with an IRB, further complicates the issue because researchers’ incentives 
regarding disclosure are arguably not well aligned with the interests of their subjects.  
The researchers may have conflicting interests that might favor a lower threshold 
(perhaps to increase the perception of importance of the study) or a higher one (to avoid 
the expense and inconvenience of disclosure).  In addition, the investigators may not be 
adequately trained to assess clinical utility.  IRBs may also not be in a position to 
properly evaluate clinical utility because the members may lack the necessary expertise.  
IRB members are charged with protecting human subjects in research, not with making 
statistical or medical determinations of clinical usefulness, and because they are selected 
specifically for the former task, the latter may be beyond the scope of both their 
specialties and their mandate.  An additional issue is whether IRBs, which have been 
widely characterized as being overburdened,
137 would even have time to monitor the 
study and assess the results.   Thus, a case can be made that the critical determination of 
whether a given result will have clinical utility for a subject should be not be made by the 
researchers or the IRB at all.  In fact, the DHHS working group’s response to NBAC’s 
guidelines expressed concern about this particular point: “[The Working Group] . . . 
questions whether an IRB or investigator is necessarily qualified to make such judgments 
on behalf of the subject.”
138    
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In any event, the determination of the scope of any duty to disclose might 
plausibly be influenced by the guidelines from NBAC and NHLBI.  These guidelines, 
however, lack answers to important questions, such as how the determination of clinical 
utility should be made.  Both sets of guidelines also fail to account for the other issues 
raised by the DHHS working group – that, regardless of whether there is a proper 
determination as to whether the results constitute significant health information, the 
individuals who are taking part in the research may have very different ideas about what 
information they consider important to their own health.  In fact, conceptions of 
important health information will vary not only between researchers and subject but also 
among subjects themselves.  When the decision whether to return results is made by the 
investigator, the IRB, or both, but without individual consultation with each subject, it 
will necessarily be incapable of taking all of these differences into account.  And when a 
research subject is not provided information that he or she feels has important health 
implications, dissatisfaction and the potential for litigation can result. 
 
B. Proximate Causation 
The most likely route to establish that the failure to disclose was the proximate 
cause of harm would likely be a claim that the lack of information resulted in the ‘loss of 
a chance’
139 to act to prevent the formation of the disease, the progression of the 
condition, or to change medications, depending on the circumstances of the particular 
case.  For certain results, this would be rather straightforward – failure to notify of 
evidence of an early-stage disease that would have been preventable or treatable at the 
time the result was obtained, for example, would appear to fit neatly within the loss-of-a-
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chance framework.  But for many individual research findings, the causation picture will 
be much fuzzier.  And for genetic results in particular, proximate causation could prove 
quite challenging: the multi-factorial nature of most common genetic diseases – most 
arise from a combination of multiple genetic and environmental sources – would 
complicate any determination of causation.  Thus there are likely to be, in most cases, 
numerous factors that contribute to the presence of a disease or condition in any one 
individual.  And it therefore may often be quite challenging to prove that a failure to 
notify an individual of her genetic susceptibility was the proximate cause of a disease.
140  
In cases involving harm alleged to have been suffered as a result of an interaction 
between a medication and a genotype, it may be somewhat easier to prove proximate 
causation.  However, some of the same hurdles remain, including the fact that a research 
result will, if anything, probably only indicate a susceptibility to, rather than a certainty 
of, harm from a medication. 
If the question of compensable harm was reached by the court, it, too, might 
prove challenging, because the multi-factorial nature of most common diseases would 
likewise complicate this inquiry, and a court would be faced with determining how much 
of a ‘loss of a chance’ the plaintiff suffered.  To do so, a court might have to make the 
difficult determination, for example, of how much a susceptible genotype contributed to 
the development of the disease or reaction to medication.  And courts may well defer, 
thinking themselves ill-suited for such calculations. 
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The point here is that, even in the event that a duty to disclose is imposed on 
researchers by courts, the other elements of a negligence action still pose potentially 
substantial barriers to an ultimate finding of liability. 
 
V.  Potential Implications of a Researcher Duty to Disclose 
  If a court holds – or even hints – that researchers have a duty to disclose 
individual research findings to their subjects, investigators might well react to limit their 
legal exposure.  At least two plausible steps can be expected – changes to informed 
consent documents and more anonymization of tissue samples.  Each of these is 
problematic, however, and the contractual approach, in particular, may do less to reduce 
exposure than might be hoped.  Because of the potential for a patchwork of different laws 
regarding disclosure in different states, a uniform regulatory approach may be preferable.  
 
A.  Contract 
  One plausible approach to the threat of liability is to attempt to contract around 
the duty to disclose.  In practice, this could be accomplished by inserting language into 
the informed consent document stipulating that individual research findings will not be 
returned to subjects.  In theory, this would both absolve researchers of any such duty and 
honor the wishes of both parties – after all, if a subject objects to such a term in the 
informed consent document, he can either negotiate a change or opt not to participate.  
And because informed consent documents have previously been treated as binding 58 
 
contracts by courts,
141 there is reason to suspect that such an approach would be honored 
by the courts and would thereby be effective at limiting researcher liability. 
  There are several problems with the contractual approach, however.  To begin 
with, the informed consent process would likely need to be changed considerably both to 
create consistently enforceable contracts and to satisfy ethical concerns.  The 
inadequacies of informed consent are legion and have been well-documented and 
discussed.
142  Among other things, subjects often fail to understand the content of consent 
forms,
143 and rather than being treated as a process by which the researcher ensures 
meaningful informed consent, many investigators appear to treat informed consent as 
merely a goal: to get the subject’s signature on a document.
144  In short, researchers have 
generally fallen far short of the recommendations made by, among others, the Office for 
Human Research Protections that informed consent should be thought of as a process of 
educating potential subjects rather than as merely as a single step motivated by a desire to 
quickly obtain a signature on a form.
145 
  Furthermore, many investigators currently engaged in research with human 
subjects omit discussions of whether and how individual information might be 
communicated.
146  And many of those who do address the matter do so merely cursorily, 
noting quickly that individual results will not be disclosed without providing 
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justification.
147  And this is despite recommendations from several sources that the 
consent document should address whether individual results will be disclosed and justify 
that decision and the provision of model language to that effect created for consent 
forms.
148  Regrettably, many investigators appear to have ignored such suggestions.  An 
additional problem is that consent forms that do suggest the possibility of individual 
notification often use vague language about the circumstances under which disclosure 
might occur.
149  And vague language has the potential to create more legal problems. 
  Therefore, merely recommending that consent forms deal with this issue more 
explicitly and forthrightly might well have limited effect.  Of course, this is not an 
argument against a contractual approach per se, but rather an observation about potential 
practical limits of such an approach.  Certainly, if researchers are sued for failure to 
disclose results – and especially if any such litigation is successful– researchers may well 
begin to address individual findings much more frequently, thoroughly, and precisely in 
consent forms.  But there are other potential problems with the contractual approach that 
reach deeper and are less easily resolved. 
  First, courts might not consistently uphold provisions in informed consent 
documents purporting to eliminate the obligation to disclose medically significant 
research findings.  At least three considerations seem relevant here.  First, as discussed 
previously, the Common Rule prohibits exculpatory language in the informed consent 
inform.
150  If a court construes the disclosure of research findings as a researcher’s duty 
or a subject’s right, it might invalidate any provisions in the consent form that would 
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purport to circumvent that duty or negate that right.
151  Second, aside from the Common 
Rule, a court might find any such contractual provision invalid purely on public policy 
grounds.  Indeed, in Reed, the court said that it would not allow physicians to contract 
around the duty to disclose in the context of third-party physical examinations because 
doing so would violate public policy.
152  Third, in certain situations, courts might take a 
dim view of the voluntariness of the consent.  In particular, when physicians recommend 
participation in a clinical trial to their (perhaps desperately) ill patients, the subsequent 
decision of those patients to participate is arguably not wholly voluntary.
153 
The point is not that courts necessarily will regularly choose to invalidate or 
disregard provisions in informed consent forms that purport to relieve an investigator of 
the duty to disclose individual research findings with medical significance to her subjects.  
It is merely that there are plausible reasons why some courts might choose to do so.  And 
a patchwork of different court holdings on this issue would seem problematic for 
researchers, especially for those studies that involve institutions in multiple states.  
Consistency would seem to be far preferable for researchers. 
  Furthermore, to the extent that the contracting approach draws support from a 
market justification, it is problematic because it assumes a faith in the marketplace that 
seems misplaced here.  In theory, the disclosure of individual research findings could be 
left to the market, with the notion that potential research subjects might shop among 
different protocols, selecting the one with the package of risks and benefits that best suits 
                                                 
151 See Vodopest, 120 Wash.2d 840 (invalidating exculpatory clause in consent form). 
152 Reed, 166 N.J. at 106-07. 
153 See David A. Lenrow, The Treating Physician as Researcher: Is Assuming this Dual Role a Violation of 
the Nuremberg Code?, 25 Temp. J. Sci. Tech. & Envtl. L. 15, 40-41 (2006) (arguing that informed consent 
might not truly be the product of free choice when a treating physician suggests to a patient that the latter 
enroll in a clinical trial). 61 
 
their preferences.  If such a market worked and subjects preferred protocols with contract 
terms that promised them that they would be notified of any individually important 
information, such a preference would presumably come to be represented in the 
marketplace and increasing numbers of researchers would promise to return individual 
research findings. 
  But there is reason to doubt that such a well-functioning market is likely either to 
exist now or to develop in the future in the context of research with human subjects.  A 
searching analysis of a market for research is well beyond the scope of this paper, but it is 
worth noting that several market failures seem likely.  First, the information asymmetry 
between researchers and potential subjects is vast and likely unbridgeable without 
substantial effort.
154   And due in part to their lack of information and understanding, 
subjects might reasonably be expected to consistently undervalue the provision of 
research findings.  Second, there are likely to be far too few sellers (researchers) in many 
market segments.  For example, many rare diseases or traits are likely to have few, if any, 
ongoing investigations.  Thus, an individual with such a trait who wishes to benefit both 
society and kin by enrolling in a research protocol may have vanishingly few – if any – 
options.
155  In response, it might be argued that such an individual can just choose to 
forego participation in research altogether.  But this ignores that, in certain situations, a 
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clinical trial might be the only realistic option for an individual to receive treatment.
156  
Therefore, the decision whether to become a research subject is not always a wholly free 
choice.  Third, the notion that any bargaining between researchers and prospective 
subjects over terms in the informed consent document will actually occur seems far-
fetched.  Rather, it can be expected that researchers will present the informed consent 
document in a take-it-or-leave-it fashion, in part because in some situations, they might 
not be able to adapt a study to meet individual preferences regarding disclosure of 
research findings. 
Finally, even assuming that investigators did modify their consent forms to treat 
the issue of disclosure of individual research findings more directly and in more depth 
and that courts consistently treated those forms as contracts that defeated challenges 
based on a failure to disclose, the normative question remains.  Contracting around a duty 
to disclose might resolve the legal issue in favor of researchers and against disclosure.  
But is this optimal?  A world in which research subjects were routinely provided with 
individualized information gleaned from their participation might well be a better world.  
Certainly, it would be one in which more people possessed more personal medical 
information that was at least potentially useful.  It might also be one, however, in which 
the cost of research is higher and less research occurs.  It is not entirely clear what the 
normatively desirable outcome is, but it is very plausible that we cannot trust that the 
desired outcome will result from widespread contracting out of duties to disclose.  If the 
contract approach was likely to actually reflect the consensus view of researchers and 
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subjects rather than just resulting from an imposition of researchers’ desires to avoid 
liability, the outcome might be more worthy of respect.  But that seems unlikely. 
Widespread and routine non-disclosure might also harm the research enterprise in 
the long run.  As discussed previously, public distrust of research has been growing, and 
many clinical trials struggle to find sufficient numbers of subjects.
157  To the extent that 
the difficulty finding subjects is linked to the growing distrust of clinical trials – which 
seems highly plausible – research participation may decline more if, for example, reports 
surface of subjects suffering otherwise preventable harm because a researcher failed to 
disclose potentially life-saving, or at least very helpful, individual information.  In short, 
because the recruitment of subjects for research depends at least in part on potential 
subjects both valuing and trusting researchers, steps that might undermine either should 
not be taken lightly.  And thus, even if routine nondisclosure appears to benefit 
researchers in the short term by saving costs and reducing other burdens, the ultimate 
result of a system in which researchers either have no tort liability to disclose individual 
research findings to their subjects or routinely contract around such liability may be a net 
negative for the enterprise of human subjects research.  
 
B.   Anonymity 
Researchers might also respond to the threat of an imposition of a duty to disclose by 
changing research protocols to foreclose the possibility of disclosure.  This can be 
accomplished by de-linking tissues donated for research from any identifying 
information.  Completely anonymizing tissue samples in this way would mean that no 
                                                 
157 See, e.g., Anthes and Allen, supra note 7. 64 
 
research finding could be traced back to a particular donor, and thus disclosure would not 
be an option.   
The anonymization approach has both practical and ethical limits, however.  From 
a pragmatic perspective, not all research can be effectively anonymized.  In general, 
research that involves more extensive interaction with subjects often requires that the 
identity of the subjects remain known.  For example, consider brain imaging studies 
wherein a subject’s brain is actively imaged as he remains under the supervision of the 
research team.  Any result obtained during the active imaging is, of course, immediately 
linked with the person in the room.  Family genetic studies also are not readily 
anonymized.  Clinical trials, although double-blinded, are generally incapable of 
complete anonymization.  But many types of research – in particular, many studies in 
which subjects merely contribute tissue samples – are amenable to anonymization.  And 
although anonymization can limit the usefulness of tissue samples and thus potentially 
has drawbacks for the researcher, the threat of liability may well encourage increased de-
linking of identifying information from tissue samples.  While taking such action would 
insulate researchers, it is also ethically problematic, at least in certain contexts.
158  But to 
the extent that the fear of liability trumps the ethical and practical considerations and 
researchers anonymize at higher rates as a result, the imposition of a duty on researchers 
to disclose medically important individual research findings may accomplish very little, 
at least in certain areas of research, beyond decreasing the usefulness of research data. 
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C.  Regulatory change  
  A change in the Common Rule or the issuance of formal, uniform guidelines from 
DHHS appears to be a superior alternative to the imposition of duty by common law and 
the expected reactions by researchers.  Change originating at the federal regulatory level 
offers several advantages.  First, researchers will likely benefit from uniform regulations 
instead of interstate variation, especially when they are engaged in multi-center research 
conducted across multiple sites in multiple states.  Predictability and stability are also 
particularly valuable for long-term research projects.  It is therefore not surprising that 
researchers have already called for uniform guidelines that are harmonized across all 
federal agencies.
159  
  A change in the Common Rule or the issuance of guidelines from DHHS is also 
advantageous in that it would presumably arise from a more inclusive process, with 
researchers and the public each given a chance to weigh in on the topic.  While such 
opportunities are not wholly foreclosed in litigation – interested organizations could have 
their voices heard via amicus curae briefs, for example – the likelihood of an inclusive 
process is higher seems change comes via federal agencies rather than the judiciary, for 
the following reason.  Although it might be the case that widespread changes in research 
would only result from multiple court decisions that presumably reflected a growing 
consensus resulting from inclusive deliberation, the notion that widespread change will 
only be triggered by widespread court decisions may be misguided, and thus widespread 
and inclusive deliberation is likely to be absent.   Because many research projects are 
                                                 
159 See NHLBI, supra note 130, at recommendations 13 and 15 (“13.  Recommendations regarding 
reporting of genetic results arising from this NHLBI working group should be coordinated and harmonized 
across all DHHS agencies (NIH, FDA, CDC, HRSA, etc.) and other federal agencies funding such research 
if possible. . . . 15.  DHHS should issue formal, uniform guidance for IRBs, institutions, investigators and 
sponsors with respect to best practices for testing and reporting genetic results in human research studies.”). 66 
 
coordinated across multiple sites in different states, researchers could well be extra 
cautious.  And thus a ruling in only one state court might trigger changes far beyond its 
borders. 
  Finally, regulatory change offers the advantage of decision-making by experts in 
the field instead of lay judges.  Human subjects research and the potential provision of 
individual research findings can be complex and intricate topics.  Although the judiciary 
has grappled with them before, on occasion, it is at least plausible that because decisions 
about duties in research have potentially broad implications for the research enterprise, 
they are better made by parties with intimate knowledge of the field. 
 
D.   Limits 
Extending a duty to disclose to researchers arguably moves the law too far in the 
direction of a general duty to rescue.  But those who fear a move toward a general duty to 
rescue should not be particularly threatened by a duty on researchers, because the 
rationale for the duty is based in large part on the pre-existing professional relationship 
and the duties already inherent in it.  Thus, the reasoning presented here does not extend 
to imposing liability on purveyors of at-home genetic tests, even though those purveyors 
will gain access to privileged information and potentially be in a unique position to 
prevent harm, because interactions with such purveyors are arm’s-length transactions, 






  Research with human subjects advances many important societal goals.  And 
courts appear appropriately wary of introducing new legal constraints into the research 
enterprise.  But the common law has advanced such that the imposition of a researcher 
duty to disclose individual research findings that are clinically useful to subjects appears 
to be a logical next step.  In fact, the case for a researcher duty to disclose is arguably 
significantly stronger than for duties already imposed by the common law.  Because a 
common law duty and the expected reactions to it are potentially problematic for the 
research enterprise, a uniform federal regulatory approach offers significant advantages. 
   